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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE LAWYER AS ABOLITIONIST: ENDING HOMELESSNESS AND
POVERTY IN OUR TIME
FLORENCE WAGMAN ROISMAN*
“We see dimly in the Present
what is small and what is
great,
Slow of faith how weak an arm
may turn the iron helm of
fate,
But the soul is still oracular; amid
the market’s din. . . .”1

Homelessness and poverty are “formidable institutions which appear[] to
be . . . invulnerable” and “could never be abolished.”2 Ending homelessness
and poverty are said to be “economically unfeasible.”3 People who seek to end
homelessness and poverty are “fringe figure[s],”4 “very remote from the

* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis.
For stimulating
presentations and responses to this and other contributions to this volume, I thank the participants
in the symposium sponsored by The Saint Louis University Public Law Review and the ABA
Commission on Homelessness and Poverty. This article is very much a preliminary work,
unworthy even to be called “notes toward” an agenda for continued reform; I hope that it will
stimulate further thought, discussion, and exchange of views. I am grateful to Professor Sidney
Watson, editor of this collection, for encouraging me to participate in this symposium and begin
this assessment; to Mary Ellen Hombs, for making me see the connection between the
abolitionists and the campaign of which she has been a leader; to Jonathan D. Asher, for very
thoughtful criticism; to Terri Murry-Whalen for excellent research assistance; to the ABA
Commission on Homelessness and Poverty, which provided support for that assistance; and to
Mary R. Deer, for outstanding secretarial and other aid. All errors and inadequacies are, of
course, mine.
This article is dedicated to the memory of Gary Bellow, who enabled and inspired
thousands of lawyers to battle effectively for justice for poor people and constantly admonished
us to fight for fundamental change.
1. JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, THE PRESENT CRISIS (1844), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN
POETRY: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 683-84 (Library of America 1993). This poem furnished
the title for The Crisis, the Journal of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP). See MARY WHITE OVINGTON, BLACK AND WHITE SAT DOWN TOGETHER:
THE REMINISCENCES OF AN NAACP FOUNDER 67 (1995).
2. See infra note 17.
3. See id.
4. See id.
237
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mainstream,”5 “a powerless and marginal handful”6 of reformers, “without
influence or position, poor and little known, strong only in their convictions
and faith in the justice of their cause,”7 “a very small minority”8 that is
“despised, scorned, and actively opposed.”9 Their campaign seems “absurd.”10
Acknowledging this, I nonetheless urge that lawyers focus on abolishing
homelessness and the cause of homelessness: poverty. I use the word
“abolition” deliberately, to make the connection to the battles against slavery
in the nineteenth century and for civil rights in the twentieth century.11 I urge
this focus not only to inspire those who battle against homelessness and
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See infra note 17.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. At its founding, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People often
was referred to as the “new abolitionist movement.” See CHARLES FLINT KELLOGG, NAACP: A
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE: 19091920, at 90, 139 (1967) (referring to “the new abolition movement, which had as its goal the
completion of emancipation”). There were in fact many connections between those who had
advocated the immediate abolition of slavery and those involved in the early days of the NAACP.
Among the principal founders and early leaders of the NAACP were Oswald Garrison Villard,
grandson of William Lloyd Garrison, and Moorfield Storey, who had been secretary to
abolitionist Senator Charles Sumner. See id. at 5-6 (regarding the Garrison and Villard families);
WILLIAM B. HIXSON, JR., MOORFIELD STOREY AND THE ABOLITIONIST TRADITION 8-11, 99
(1972) (“Storey, as secretary to Sumner, absorbed the humanitarian concerns and the moralistic
approach to politics that characterized the Conscience Whigs of Massachusetts.”). Others’ “lives
embraced the two abolition movements.” See KELLOGG, supra at 91 (discussing Fanny Garrison
Villard, the second William Lloyd Garrison, Francis Jackson Garrison, and Albert E. Pillsbury).
Joel Springarn, a crucial leader of the new NAACP, deliberately “reached back in time to
resurrect the spirit of nineteenth-century Abolitionism, the only major movement in American
history which approximated the NAACP’s ideal of equal rights and fair treatment for black
Americans. . .Beginning with the first New Abolition campaign in 1913, Springarn embraced the
courage and determination of the nineteenth-century Abolitionists with a fervor which rivaled that
of Garrison and Phillips.” B. JOYCE ROSS, J.E. SPRINGARN AND THE RISE OF THE NAACP, 19111931, at 25-26 (1972). There were other, deliberate ties between the two movements. See, e.g.,
KELLOGG, supra at 120 (“To further the tie between abolitionism and the new movement, the
Boston. . . branch [of the NAACP] was organized with fifty-six members, including the majority
of the sons and daughters of the most noted New England abolition leaders.”).
Later in the twentieth century, when students and others lent important new support to
the civil rights movement in the 1960’s, they too were linked to the abolition movement. See
HOWARD ZINN, SNCC: THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS (1965); Howard Zinn, Abolitionists, FreedomRiders, and the Tactics of Agitation, in THE ANTISLAVERY VANGUARD: NEW ESSAYS ON THE
ABOLITIONISTS 417, 446 (Martin Duberman ed., 1965) (“a successor to the abolitionist: the sit-in
agitator, the boycotter, the Freedom Rider of the 1960’s”); id. at 450 (“The movement for
desegregation today [before 1965] has all the elements of the abolition movement: its moral
fervor and excitement, its small group of martyrs and mass of passive supporters, its occasional
explosions in mob scenes and violence.”).
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poverty with the prospect of ultimate victory, but also because defining the
relief one seeks is critically important to determining what relief one will
achieve.12
As “impregnable,”13 ineradicable, and intractable14 as homelessness and
poverty seem today,15 so impregnable, ineradicable, and intractable did slavery
seem in the nineteenth century and segregation in the twentieth.16 As
marginalized, powerless, and quixotic as seem those who fight against
homelessness and poverty today, so marginalized, powerless, and quixotic did
the abolitionists appear in the nineteenth century and the civil rights workers in
the twentieth. Indeed, each of the statements that begins this article was made,
not of homelessness or poverty or segregation, but of human chattel slavery in
the United States.17 Just as the “powerless and marginal handful” of
12. See Daniel M. Cress & David A. Snow, The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The
Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1063,
1100-01 (2000) (concluding that the success of organizations seeking relief for homeless people
depends significantly upon “articulate and coherent diagnostic and prognostic framing”).
“Diagnostic framing is important because it problematizes and focuses attention on an issue,
helps shape how the issue is perceived, and identifies who or what is culpable, thereby identifying
the targets or sources of the outcomes sought; prognostic framing is important because it
stipulates specific remedies or goals for the [organization] to work toward and the means or
tactics for achieving these objectives.” Id. at 1071.
13. See infra note 17.
14. See id.
15. See John O. Calmore, A Call for Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause
Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1950
(1999) (“We cannot eliminate poverty; we cannot really move very many out of poverty.”).
16. See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS 15 (1996) (“Thinkers and statesmen and leaders and realistic
politicians of all stripes and attachments believed that American slavery could not be ended – not
by deliberate human action.”); JOHN EGERTON, SPEAK NOW AGAINST THE DAY: THE
GENERATION BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH 30-33 (1994) (describing
the South’s “ironclad system of segregation” and the political power of those who maintained it).
17. See MILLER, supra note 16, at 9 (“Slavery had become, by the second quarter of the
nineteenth century, an immense, rooted institution. American slavery, many believed. . .could
never be abolished.”) (emphasis in original); id. at 502 (“formidable institution. . .never could be
abolished”); id. at 454 (“impregnable”); id. at 9 (“apparently invincible,”
“formidable. . .impossible to eliminate”); id. at 502 (“American slavery in 1835 was a formidable
institution which appeared to be. . . invulnerable. It could never be abolished”); id. at 10
(“emancipation by government action was economically unfeasible”); id. at 36 (abolitionists were
regarded as “fanatics”); id. at 352 (abolitionist leaders were “fringe figure[s]”); id. at 53 (“very
remote from the mainstream”); id. at 65 (“powerless and marginal handful”); id. at 69 (“without
influence or position,” their endeavor “seemed absurd”); id. at 76 (“very small minority that was
despised, scorned, and actively opposed”).
Of course, in some places some abolitionists were respected members of the community
even in the early years. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, The Antislavery and Abolitionist Background
of John A. Bingham, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 881, 930 (1988) (In Cadiz, Ohio, “there were active
antislavery and abolitionist advocates who were not outcasts, but rather prominent members of
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abolitionists witnessed the immediate, unconditional end of slavery, and the
quixotic, idealistic reformers of the twentieth century saw the end of de jure
segregation,18 so should success come to those who will battle now not simply
to ameliorate but to eliminate homelessness and poverty in the United States.
I respect and honor any action taken by anyone to alleviate the suffering of
a person who is homeless, hungry, or otherwise enduring the evil effects of
poverty. Immense energy is devoted, by volunteers and paid workers, to feed,
shelter, and clothe poor people, to provide health care and other essential
services to them, to protect them from the ravages of the criminal “justice”
system, and otherwise to succor them in various ways. All of this is admirable,
but it is not enough. Time, thought, and energy also must be dedicated to
reforming the economic, social, political, and cultural structures that allow
homelessness and poverty to exist. And lawyers have skills that are especially
useful for this work.19
society.”). In general, however, it was not until “after the outbreak of the Civil War [that]
abolitionists were transformed almost overnight from despised fanatics to influential and
respected spokesmen for the radical wing of the Republican party.” JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY vii (1964).
See also 1 JAMES FORD RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE
COMPROMISE OF 1850 TO THE FINAL RESTORATION OF HOME RULE AT THE SOUTH IN 1877, at
58 (1906) (“Good society turned the back upon the abolitionists. . .The churches were bitterly
opposed to the movement”); Charles Sumner’s Eulogy for Thaddeus Stevens, delivered in the
U.S. Senate (December 18, 1868), in EDWARD BELCHER CALLENDER, THADDEUS STEVENS:
COMMONER 200, 201 (1882) (speaking of Josiah Quincy, Joshua Giddings, John Quincy Adams,
and Stevens, Sumner said: “All of these hated slavery, and labored for its overthrow. On this
account they were a mark for obloquy, and were generally in a minority.”).
18. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 16, at 29 (“the new abolitionists. . .were not
powerful. . .”). In 1834, a mob attacked the home of abolitionist Lewis Tappan and gutted
homes, churches, and businesses owned by blacks; in 1835, a “respectable” mob in Boston seized
and bound William Lloyd Garrison “and paraded him through the streets,” and a mob in Utica,
New York, prevented the “disgrace” of having an abolitionist meeting in that city; in 1837,
abolitionist preacher-editor Elijah Lovejoy was killed by a mob in Alton, Illinois. Id. at 17, 7778. In 1836, “the support for abolition was miniscule; the abolitionist orators were being stoned
and mobbed even in the North; the poll results (if polls had existed in those days) would have
shown very meager support for trying to abolish slavery even in the District of Columbia, and
overwhelming detestation personally for those obnoxious abolitionists, who tried to force people
to think about subjects they did not want to think about. They didn’t have any support.” Id. at
120-21. In 1836, “[a]lmost everybody denounced the abolitionists; it was a politically safe
position.” Id. at 143. “Certainly the abolitionists after 1831 would be subjected to the most
severe and insistent and constant derogation, of every kind, which to some extent continued into
history-writing in the twentieth century.” Id. at 182.
With respect to the twentieth century civil rights workers, see, e.g., David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the Introduction
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 645 (1995).
19. I do not at all mean to suggest that lawyers should control such work, or that their
contributions are the most important. I suggest only that lawyers have important roles to play in
such efforts. For discussions of ways in which lawyers may participate in such movements, see
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This article presents some thoughts about that effort. Part I outlines ways
in which the battle against homelessness and poverty is like the battles against
slavery and segregation. Part II shows that solutions to the problems of
homelessness and poverty are not more radical than solutions to slavery and
segregation. Part III considers what special contributions lawyers might make
to the abolition of homelessness and poverty.
I.

THE BATTLE TO ABOLISH HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY IS LIKE THE
BATTLES TO ABOLISH SLAVERY AND SEGREGATION

If I may do so without being disrespectful, I want to suggest that
homelessness and poverty are, for our era, the equivalent of slavery and
segregation: institutions that blight and stunt human life, causing misery,
illness, and death.20 Indeed, the battle against homelessness and poverty is in
several ways a continuation of the movements to abolish slavery and de jure
and de facto segregation.
First, homelessness and poverty disproportionately affect the same kinds of
people for whom the nineteenth and twentieth century abolitionists fought:
people of color, predominantly African-Americans and Latinos.21 The
Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons From Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988
WIS. L. REV. 699 (1988) [hereinafter To Learn and Teach]; Lucie E. White, Collaborative
Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV.
157 (1994) [hereinafter Collaborative Lawyering in the Field]; GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS
LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); William H.
Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in
the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099 (1996) and material therein cited,
particularly at 1100 n.3.
20. See, e.g., JONATHAN KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN: HOMELESS FAMILIES IN
AMERICA (1988) (describing the lives of homeless families); ELLIOT LIEBOW, TELL THEM WHO
I AM: THE LIVES OF HOMELESS WOMEN (1993) (describing the lives of homeless women). For
the health implications, see J.R. Hibbs et al., Mortality in a Cohort of Homeless Adults in
Philadelphia, 331 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 304, 306 (1994) (homeless people are sicker and have an
age-adjusted mortality rate almost four times higher than that of the general population); S.W.
Hwang et al., Causes of Death in Homeless Adults in Boston, 126 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 625,
626 (1997) (average age at death among a cohort of homeless people in Boston was forty-seven
years); Jon V. Martel et. al., Hospitalization in an Urban Homeless Population: The Honolulu
Urban Homeless Project, 116 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 299, 300 (1992) (homeless people utilize
more health care resources and require more acute care than do non-homeless people); Thomas P.
O’Toole et al., Utilization of Health Care Services Among Subgroups of Urban Homeless and
Housed Poor, 24 J. HEALTH POL’Y & L. 91 (1999) (summarizing these studies); COMMITTEE ON
HEALTH CARE FOR HOMELESS PEOPLE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HOMELESSNESS, HEALTH, AND
HUMAN NEEDS 141 (1988) (concluding that “the fundamental problem encountered by homeless
people—lack of a stable residence—has a direct and deleterious impact on health”).
21. See INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON THE HOMELESS, HOMELESSNESS PROGRAMS AND THE
PEOPLE THEY SERVE: Summary, at 15 (1999) (40% of homeless clients are black, 11%
“Hispanic,” 8% Native American, 41% non-Hispanic whites). For variations in different studies,
with percent non-Hispanic white ranging from 85% to 17%, see Martha R. Burt, Demographics
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problems that beset African-Americans were most obviously problems of
political freedom, but also were economic problems, and the economic
problems were not addressed effectively. The original abolitionists knew that
their battle was incomplete unless the freed slaves were accorded economic
redress—hence, the famous “40 acres and a mule,” recognized as necessary but
never provided.22 The NAACP’s original “emphasis . . . on civil and political
rights of Negroes to the exclusion of their economic problems was to set the
tone of the new organization for many years to come.”23 In 1966, Dr. King
admonished that “America’s greatest problem and contradiction is that it
harbors 35 million poor at a time when its resources are so vast that the
existence of poverty is an anachronism.”24 Dr. King’s movement for economic
justice, symbolized by the Poor People’s March, was frustrated by his death in
Memphis, where he had gone to support striking black sanitation workers.25
That the battle against homelessness and poverty is part of the earlier
struggles was acknowledged by the National Council of Churches and other
religious leaders recently when they issued a “covenant to overcome poverty.”
The covenant declares that “just as some of our religious forebears decided no
longer to accept slavery or segregation, we decide to no longer accept poverty
and its disproportionate impact on people of color.”26
and Geography: Estimating Needs, in PRACTICAL LESSONS: THE 1998 NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
HOMELESSNESS RESEARCH 1-4, 1-5 (Linda B. Fusburg & Deborah L. Dennis eds., 1999)
(concluding that “African-Americans are significantly overrepresented among homeless people
compared to the general population").
See also Karl E. Klare, Toward New Strategies For Low-Wage Workers, 4 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 245, 259 (1995) (“The demographic composition of low-wage work is neither gender,
nor race neutral. Women and minority group members of both sexes are considerably more likely
to be low-wage earners than [are] white males.”).
22. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877,
at 70-71 (1988) (In 1865, General Sherman issued Special Field Order No. 15, granting black
families 40 acres of land in parts of South Carolina, and offering to lend Army mules); id. at 15963 (lands restored to former owners); id. at 245-46 (legislative attempt to restore land to blacks
rejected); see also CLAUDE F. OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE (1968); and EDWARD L.
JONES, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE: THE RAPE OF COLORED AMERICANS 28-53 (1994).
23. KELLOGG, supra note 11, at 15; but see id. at 35 (“Throughout its existence the
Association made repeated attempts. . .to secure admission of Negroes to unions on a basis of
equality with white workers, but without much success.”); id. at 131 (members “were not so
interested in legal disabilities as in economic opportunities.”); DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B.
DUBOIS: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE 393, 419, 423 (1993) (regarding Dr. DuBois’ concern with
“economic aspects of race prejudice”).
24. DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 533 (1986).
25. Id. at 536 (“King’s most pressing concern was how he and the movement could pursue
the economic justice issues which increasingly preoccupied him.”).
26. Gustav Niebuhr, Christians Ask Renewed Attack on Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2000, at A14; Call to Renewal, Covenant to Overcome Poverty, available at
http://www.calltorenewal.com/covenant.html (last visited May 31, 2000).
ON
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A second similarity is that each struggle challenges widely-held views
about private property. Those who urged an end to holding human beings in
chattel slavery were confronted by the argument that the property rights of
slaveholders had to be respected.27 Part of the opposition to the civil rights
movement was the argument that the owners of restaurants, hotels, department
stores, and housing had the right to serve, house, accommodate, employ, and
do business with whomever they chose.28
Efforts to ameliorate homelessness and poverty, too, often are met with
arguments based on a broad conception of property rights. The arguments are
that services for homeless people should not locate near homes and businesses
whose owners fear reduced property values and, more generally, that money
should not be redistributed from wealthier people to enable every human being
to live decently. To challenge homelessness and poverty means to challenge a
system of private property and distribution that makes many people, including
many of those who read these words, quite comfortable.
A third element common to the three campaigns is that each is
fundamentally a moral crusade. It may seem now that the immorality of
slavery and segregation are evident, but there were powerful arguments when
these issues were salient that slavery and de jure segregation were positive
goods.29 Even in this era of considerable indeterminacy about morality, a
strong case can be made for the immorality of withholding available
sustenance from at least children and other categories of people understood to

27. See MILLER, supra note 16, at 10 (quoting Abraham Lincoln in 1854, referring to “two
thousand million of dollars, invested in this species of property. . .this immense pecuniary
interest”); id. at 11 (pointing out the financial interest in slavery of the northern textile industry as
well as the south, and that slavery “had fundamental ties to other industries—cotton, rice, indigo,
and tobacco,” among others).
28. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 310 (1994) (stating that when the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund “was first asked to defend the participants [in the 1960 sit-ins], [Thurgood]
Marshall ‘stormed around the room proclaiming. . .[that] he was not going to represent. . .students
who violated the sacred property rights of white folks. . .’”). One may infer a touch of irony here.
29. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Thomas R.R. Cobb and the Law of Negro Slavery, 5 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 75 (1999) (discussing Thomas R.R. Cobb: Georgia attorney, law professor,
scholar, and one-time reporter for the Georgia Supreme Court, who “insisted on the justice and
morality—the essential rightness—of slavery”); id. at 76 (Cobb’s treatise, THE LAW OF NEGRO
SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, argued “that slavery was consistent with
American law, good public policy, Christian morality, and the natural order of things.”); see also
RHODES, supra note 17, at 81 (describing the argument of Secretary of State John Calhoun to the
United States Senate “showing the wisdom and humanity of African slavery”).
With respect to defenders of segregation, see, e.g., JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI 66-67 (1994) (discussing the “crusading”
newspaper editor, Hodding Carter II, winner of a Pulitzer Prize in 1946 for “distinguished
editorial writing against racial and religious intolerance,” who “publicly opposed the
desegregation of Mississippi schools”). He was, Dittmer reports, a “fair play segregationist.” Id.
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be unable to care for themselves.30 There is some consensus that it is morally
unacceptable that millions of men, women, and children in the United States
go to sleep hungry at night, and have no real bed on which to sleep; that people
who need treatment for mental or physical health problems or substance abuse,
or relief from domestic violence, or subsidized housing—all are met not by the
needed services but by waiting lists; that physical and mental illnesses that we
know how to treat are allowed to ravage and kill people because the people
cannot afford the treatments that are available; that we provide to the old, the
blind, and the disabled, and to the needy parents of dependent children,
stipends that are far below what the federal government has identified as a
“poverty threshold”—stipends egregiously inadequate to enable the families to
afford decent housing; that, in many parts of the United States, two people
working full time at minimum wage jobs do not earn enough to afford what
HUD says is a fair market rent for a two bedroom unit; that people who work
full-time do not earn enough to take their families out of poverty.31
Today, we all condemn slavery and de jure segregation, and we are sure
that we would have been among those fighting those obvious injustices. But in
the nineteenth century, many lawyers and others defended slavery,32 or urged
that gradualism mark its elimination, and the twentieth century laws against
segregation had many defenders.33 I often hear students and young colleagues
express nostalgia for the civil rights struggle of the early 1960’s, regretting that
they are not able to make their mark in the crusade for justice as the 1960’s

30. See Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L. J. 1860
(1987) (quoting Gloria Anzaldua, La Prieta, in THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK 198, 208 (C.
Moraga & G. Anzaldua eds., 1981) (“I can’t reconcile the sight of a battered child with the belief
that we choose what happens to us, that we create our own world.”)).
31. See National Low Income Housing Coalition/Low Income Housing Information Service
(NLIHC/LIHIS), Out of Reach: The Growing Gap Between Housing Costs and Income of Poor
People in the United States, at http://www.nlihc.org/oor2000/introduction.htm (last visited Feb.
22, 2001); LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 1998-99, at 309
(1999) (hourly wage required to bring a family of four to the 1997 poverty line was $7.89 per
hour).
32. See Finkleman, supra note 29, at 93 (Thomas R.R. Cobb was in what was regarded as
good company: “Harvard Law School [was not] a hot-bed of antislavery. On the contrary, the
faculty supported the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, as did many of the
students.”); Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves: The Anthony Burns Case, Judge
Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1793, 1838-1840 (1996) (Harvard “law
school professors . . . cheered the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 and defended it in
their lectures.”).
33. See, e.g., Alfred Avins, Freedom of Choice in Personal Service Occupations: Thirteenth
Amendment Limitations on Antidiscrimination Legislation, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 228 (1964)
(arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 violates the Thirteenth Amendment); Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Emancipation and the New Conception of Freedom: Comment on Nieman:
Reflections on "From Slaves to Citizens," 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2141, 2144 (1996) (discussing
and citing some of this scholarship).
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civil rights workers did. But what these students and colleagues need to see is
that the current challenge is as urgent and life-defining as the 1960’s civil
rights battle was, and that the glory of those crusaders can be earned now by
people who will make the same commitment to fighting the battle as it presents
itself today—to conquer homelessness and poverty.34
II. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY ARE
NOT MORE RADICAL THAN WERE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF SLAVERY
AND SEGREGATION
What must be done to end homelessness and poverty is not more dramatic
or radical than what was required to end slavery and de jure segregation.
To end slavery required a civil war, a series of amendments to the federal
constitution,35 a succession of civil rights acts,36 and a general reconstruction
of the governance of the United States.37 To end de jure segregation required
extraordinary campaigns of direct action and great personal courage,38
substantive new local, state, and federal legislation,39 reinterpretation of the
1866 Civil Rights Act,40 and countless law suits. The battle against de facto
segregation still has not been concluded.
Ending homelessness and poverty could be accomplished much more
easily.
Homelessness and poverty do not need to exist; we understand their nature
and have the tools to prevent them. Homelessness, after all, was not a major
34. See MILLER, supra note 16, at 513 (“For slavery to be ended there had to be some
individual human beings who did what they did. . .there were some people—a very small number,
on the margin of society, condemned and harassed—who nevertheless made it the first order of
their life’s business to oppose American slavery, and to insist that it was a grotesque evil that
should be eliminated, and. . .in a little over thirty years, it was.”).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; and U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
36. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §1981 et seq.; Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C.
§1981; Civil Rights Act of 1875, 42 U.S.C. §1984.
37. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 22; W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN
AMERICA (1935).
38. See, e.g., Egerton, supra note 16; JOANN GIBSON ROBINSON, THE MONTGOMERY BUS
BOYCOTT AND THE WOMEN WHO STARTED IT (1987); CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE:
SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960’S (1981); TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE
WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 (1988); TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE:
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65 (1998); WILLIAM BRADFORD HUIE, THREE LIVES FOR
MISSISSIPPI (1965); JOHN LEWIS WITH MICHAEL D’ORSO, WALKING WITH THE WIND: A
MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT (1998); ERIC R. BURNER, AND GENTLY HE SHALL LEAD THEM:
ROBERT PARRIS MOSES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI (1994).
39. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Civil Rights Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,
79 Stat. 437 (1965).
40. See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976).
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problem in the United States until about 1980.41 As we were able to assure
housing to most people before 1980, we could do so now.
Similarly, poverty can be substantially reduced, if not eliminated, and its
effects can be greatly alleviated, by changes in laws and social policies.42
There is no lack of knowledge of how to do this—it has been done in other
countries.43 The need is to develop the political will to make this happen. This
requires changing social understanding—making homelessness and poverty
unacceptable, as slavery and de jure segregation were made unacceptable. It
requires attention to the issues of race and gender that distort perceptions of
homelessness and poverty.44 There must be a “paradigm shift,” an “abnormal
discourse that puts homelessness and poverty beyond the pale.”45
We know that the two keys to ending homelessness and poverty are
housing and income. “Every study that has looked has found that affordable,
usually subsidized housing, prevents homelessness more effectively than
anything else. This is true for all groups of poor people, including those with

41. See MARTHA R. BURT, OVER THE EDGE: THE GROWTH OF HOMELESSNESS IN THE
1980’s, at viii (1992); Lucie E. White, Representing “The Real Deal,” 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 271,
271-72 (1990).
42. But see White, supra note 41, at 279 n.25. The Biblical statement is not about the future;
it is: “ye have the poor always with you. . .” Matthew 26:11 (emphasis added).
43. See Robert M. Solow, Welfare: The Cheapest Country, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 23,
2000, at 20 (reviewing ROBERT E. GOODIN ET AL., THE REAL WORLDS OF CAPITALISM (1999));
Klare, supra note 21, at 259 (“When other countries have made significant progress in
ameliorating poverty, reducing wage inequality, and lifting the wage floor, low-wage
employment has been perpetuated in the United States by our laws and social policies.”).
44. See Calmore, supra note 15, at 1955 (“When race and space are synergistically involved
with poverty, race-neutral or color-blind poverty practice is naively wrong-headed.”).
45. See White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 750 n.185 (citing THOMAS S. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) (regarding paradigm shifts); and RICHARD
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979) (regarding “abnormal discourse”)).
See also id. at 755 n.199 (NAACP/LDF campaign against school segregation required
“expanding the legal norm of equality. . .”).
Michael Harrington’s 1962 book, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES, often is credited with “rekindl[ing], spark[ing]” this kind of new debate. See John
Charles Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner Commission in Retrospect—An
Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289 (1993); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM
THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 20 (1989) (saying that Harrington’s was “a
pivotal book” designed “to arouse the conscience of the nation”); Victor Navasky, The Left Wing
of the Possible, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., May 28, 2000, at 9 (reviewing MAURICE ISSERMAN,
THE OTHER AMERICAN: THE LIFE OF MICHAEL HARRINGTON (2000), and stating that
“Harrington’s book supplied the organizing concept, the target, the word, and thus was the idea
for the War on Poverty born. It can indeed be argued that what Betty Friedan’s ‘Feminist
Mystique’ did for feminism, Rachel Carson’s ‘Silent Spring’ for the environment, and Ralph
Nader’s ‘Unsafe at any Speed’ for the public interest movement, The Other America did for the
poor.”).
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persistent and severe mental illness and/or substance abuse.”46 We must
establish that governments have an obligation to provide housing or subsidies
for housing for very low income people. Just as we need universal health
insurance, we need universal housing assurance. In the short term, we must
prevent demolition without adequate replacement housing; restore the one-forone replacement requirement;47 and lobby for increased federal, state, and local
subsidies for very low income people, subsidies to match those provided for
people who are rich.48
With respect to income, there are at least “five branches of law [that]
determine the social minimum wage and benefits package: employer mandates,
government contracting and purchasing standards, government benefits
programs, immigration and international trade rules,” and “the background
regime of legal entitlements and prohibitions that structure power relations
between employers and employees . . . .”49 Workers’ pay should be keyed to
living costs, so that one who works full-time earns enough to support a family
decently. We need to increase the minimum wage50 and mandated benefits.
The Earned Income Tax Credit should be increased. Working conditions must
be improved.51 Government agencies all should be required to pay a housing
wage—that is, a wage that enables a full-time worker to afford appropriate
housing, with not more than 30% of her or his income.52 Income maintenance
programs must be improved so that they provide more money and reach more

46. Marybeth Shinn & Jim Baumohl, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
& U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Rethinking the Prevention of Homelessness,
in PRACTICAL LESSONS, supra note 21, at 13-1. See also White, Collaborative Lawyering in the
Field, supra note 19, at 280-91. Homelessness is caused by poverty, not by “substance abuse” or
mental illness. Many people who abuse alcohol or drugs or suffer from mental illness
nonetheless are perfectly well-housed.
47. See Florence Wagman Roisman, Intentional Racial Discrimination and Segregation by
the Federal Government as a Principal Cause of Concentrated Poverty: A Response to Schill and
Wachter, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 1351, 1369-72 (1995) (discussing the “one for one replacement”
requirement); Michael S. Fitzpatrick, Note: A Disaster in Every Generation: An Analysis of
HOPE VI: HUD’s Newest Big Budget Development Plan, 7 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 421,
444 (2000) (the requirement was repealed in 1997).
48. The largest federal housing subsidy by far is the homeowner deduction for mortgage
interest and real estate taxes. See John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A
Fair Share Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1608 (1993).
49. Klare, supra note 21, at 260 n.53 (identifying these five branches of law).
50. See MISHEL ET AL., supra note 31, at 189-95 (documenting the fall of the real value of
the minimum wage since the 1960’s and the impact on non-teenage, full-time workers, of whom
most are women and a disproportionate percentage minorities. The current minimum wage is less
than the federal poverty level).
51. For a powerful, personal indictment of working conditions, see Lucie E. White, No Exit:
Rethinking “Welfare Dependency” from a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1979-85 (1993).
52. See Call to Renewal, supra note 26 (a summary of those goals).
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eligible people.53 Increasing income is important not only so that homeless
people themselves have more income, but also so that low-income families
have enough to help to care for others who are destitute. 54
III. WHAT THEN SHOULD WE LAWYERS DO?
I do not think one ever knows with certainty what act will produce what
result: one cannot predict with confidence which actions will make the greatest
contribution to ending homelessness and poverty. Lawyers play many
different roles, personally and professionally. We can function as counselors
or as advocates, in judicial, administrative, legislative, or other forums, at the
local, state, and federal levels. In some cases, effective attention to the discrete
problems of an individual may lead to extensive societal consequences.55 In
other situations, working with or supporting a charismatic leader may have

53. Federal benefit programs do not provide enough in stipends to enable people to afford
what HUD says are fair market rents.
See NLIHC/LIHIS, supra note 31, at
http://www.nlihc.org/oor2000/introduction.htm. A recent study reports that only 37% of the
people who use homeless assistance programs receive food stamps; only 52% of homeless
households with children receive Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC); and only 6%
of homeless veterans receive veteran-related disability payments and 2% receive veteran-related
pensions. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON THE HOMELESS, HOMELESSNESS PROGRAMS AND THE
PEOPLE THEY SERVE: FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF HOMELESS ASSISTANCE
PROVIDERS AND CLIENTS, Summary, at xix-xx (1999). See also Shinn & Baumohl, supra note
46, at 13-1 (“Income supports are also related to housing stability, probably because the
affordability of housing is a joint function of income and housing costs. Advocacy for
entitlement income may be a key ingredient in case management.”). The replacement of AFDC
by TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) with its time limit on benefits may well
increase dramatically the number of homeless people. See Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s
Children: Sustaining the Family’s Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1740
(2000) (book review) (reporting that in one Wisconsin county, the number of homeless children
increased by 50% after the implementation of welfare reform).
54. See PETER H. ROSSI, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF HOMELESSNESS
188-90 (1989) (discussing the extent and burden of poor families' caring for others).
55. I think here of the defenses of individual landlord-tenant cases, which led to the
widespread adoption of the doctrines of implied warranty of habitability and retaliatory eviction.
See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969); Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968). Javins was part of a buildingwide rent strike and tenant organization, but Brown and Edwards were defenses of discrete
landlord-tenant cases, as were other seminal cases. See also, Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526
(N.J. 1970); Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168 (Cal. 1974). See also Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (individual consumer case); see generally,
JOHN A. DOOLEY & ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, LEGAL SERVICES HISTORY (1984); Alan W.
Houseman, Political Lessons, Legal Services for the Poor—A Commentary, 83 GEO. L.J. 1669
(1995); EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL
SERVICES PROGRAM (1974).
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immense impact.56 In yet other circumstances, lawyers may have the greatest
impact by supporting groups of people who take direct action of various
forms.57
Part of what determines what we will do is each individual’s particular
combination of temperament, inclination, and skill. Part is the mystery of
chance or providence: being in a particular place at a particular time and
having the courage to say “yes” to the unusual.58 This requires creativity,
flexibility,59 perseverance, and communication with others.60 We must be
ready to support people and movements when they arise.61
56. The legal assistance provided to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. is an example of this kind of
legal work, as is the legal support for Cesar Chavez and Mitch Snyder. See, e.g., Oppenheimer,
supra note 18; Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections on Political Lawyering,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 309 n.3 (1996) (describing legal work for Cesar Chavez);
VICTORIA RADER, SIGNAL THROUGH THE FLAMES: MITCH SNYDER AND AMERICA’S HOMELESS
235-36 (1986) (regarding the events addressed in Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir.
1985)). Other litigation supporting Synder’s activities includes: Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (copyright issue regarding statue of homeless family);
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (sleeping in Lafayette Park
to protest homelessness); Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d 382 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (vigil on the grounds of the United States Capitol); Community for Creative NonViolence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (challenge to HUD report on homelessness);
Williams v. Barry, 708 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (closing shelters for homeless men); Caton v.
Barry, 500 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1980) (shelters for families); Atchison v. District of Columbia,
585 A.2d 150 (D.C. 1991) (provision of overnight shelter).
57. The legal support for the Montgomery Bus Boycott is a good illustration. See BRANCH,
PARTING THE WATERS, supra note 38, at 158-59 (1988) (describing the lawyers’ initial efforts);
TUSHNET, supra note 28, at 302-06 (describing the role of the NAACP/LDF). See also Francesca
Polletta, The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 19611966, 34 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 367 (2000) (discussing the relationship between political
organizing and “rights claims”).
58. See MARK V. TUSHET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at xii (1987) (“Sensitivity to the actual events requires attention to the
roles of chance – unexpected events or decisions by individuals outside of the movement – and
choice – decisions by insiders to pursue one path rather than another ….”) [hereinafter NAACP’S
LEGAL STRATEGY]. My own experience has been that when a moment of decision presents itself,
taking the risk is worthwhile.
59. See TUSHNET, NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY, supra note 58, at 144-45 (emphasizing that
“the NAACP’s efforts were not systematic or strategic. Instead, the organization attacked . . .
targets of opportunity.”).
60. See AILEEN S. KRADITOR, MEANS AND ENDS IN AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM: GARRISON
AND HIS CRITICS ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS, 1834-1850, at 236 (1967) (“The frequent
meetings and intragroup journals of any movement for change serve an indispensable function
even when they repeatedly pass the same resolutions and proclaim familiar truths to the already
committed. These activities help to assure members that they are part of a group with a historic
mission, are not fighting alone, and have somewhere to go and others to turn to when public
opprobrium weakens their dedication.”); TUSHNET, supra note 28, at 124-25 (importance of
NAACP meetings of lawyers to discuss segregation in education); Bellow, supra note 56, at 308
(deploring “the lack of funds for meetings, conferences, and other forms of networking that
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While we cannot know with certainty what will have the greatest impact,
we ought to be thinking about what will do so, and we ought to choose our
activities, taking into account temperament and circumstance, based on our
best judgments about what will do the most not only to treat symptoms of
inequality and deprivation but to eliminate inequality and deprivation. We
must be prepared to make hard choices. We have limited resources, and
cannot do everything; we must be strategic, and focus our attention on
advocacy that is likely to create the greatest improvement.62 Whatever we may
choose to do, in all that we do we must keep in mind and work toward the
ultimate objective of radically changing a system that tolerates (or requires) the
existence of extreme deprivation and inequality with respect to the essentials of
human existence.
We do well to ponder the relative values of reform and radicalism.
Reformist measures may bring comfort to particular individuals, both needy
beneficiaries and people who want to do good without undermining a system

formerly enabled political lawyers to recruit and teach those who might follow.”); Michael H.
Shuman, Why Do Progressive Foundations Give Too Little to Too Many?, 266 THE NATION, Jan.
12, 1998, at 11-12 (describing the effectiveness of conservative foundations and the relative
ineffectiveness of progressive foundations); Klare, supra note 21, at 267 (“revitalizing labor/poor
peoples’ alliances today requires hard work: establishing connections, fostering dialogue,
promoting education and mutual concern, and learning creative ways to engage in joint action
around common issues.”); White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 725 n.110 (“the
technique of ‘brainstorming,’ or generating ideas through a process of group discussion, is an
essential step in developing innovative sources of leverage and solutions to problems.”).
A hopeful sign was the establishment of the Task Force on Legal Strategies for LowWage Workers. See Klare, supra note 22, at 248-9. As Professor Klare indicates, “low-wage
workers” is a category that includes public assistance recipients, immigrants, and people who are
elderly or disabled. See id. at 250; and, as to public assistance recipients, KATHRYN EDIN &
LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOWWAGE WORK 220 (1997) (“Welfare- and work-reliant mothers should be seen as two overlapping
populations on a single continuum.”). Similarly, people who are homeless—often dehumanized
as “the homeless”—are workers. A recent study shows that 44% of homeless clients worked for
pay. See HOMELESSNESS PROGRAMS AND THE PEOPLE THEY SERVE, supra note 21, at 52-54.
61. See, e.g., New Party, The New Party Living Wage Campaign, at
http://www.newparty.org/livwag/livwag.html; National Jobs for All Coalition, Living Wage
Campaign, at http://www.njfac.org/ resources/html; Justice for Janitors, Janitors are Fighting for
the American Dream, at http://seiu.org/j4j/j4j2000.cfm. (last visited on Feb. 22, 2001).
62. See, e.g., TUSHNET, NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY, supra note 58 (describing the
NAACP’s campaign against segregated public schools, when Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood
Robinson, Louis Redding, and other lawyers responded to requests for assistance with other kinds
of lawsuits by insisting that they would support only comprehensive desegregation cases). See
also, ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 56
(1975) (explaining that “advocacy in these [anti-slavery] cases was highly ideological. It was
undertaken for purposes of the movement – to dramatize the inconsistency of slavery with
underlying principles of a democratic state”).
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that has treated them well.63 There always is a danger “that ad hoc alliances for
partial ends may under certain circumstances strengthen the hegemony of the
enemy by legitimizing the institutions, and the ideological justifications of
those institutions, by means of which the enemy exercises his hegemony.”64
In deciding how to abolish homelessness and poverty, we can take lessons
from the abolitionists, original and new. We can be educated by their
techniques, energized by their moral fervor, and encouraged by their successes.
For the twentieth century abolitionists, as for those of the nineteenth century,
“the aim . . . was to fight the ‘new slavery’ by means which were then
considered radical—non-violent agitation, well-publicized protest, propaganda,
and legal action.”65
Now, as in those eras, public education is a critical element of the
campaign.66 Lawyers are trained as wordsmiths: our skills at description and
persuasion are well-employed with media and the public as well as with
judges, administrators, and legislators.67

63. See Zinn, Abolitionists, Freedom-Riders, and the Tactics of Agitation, supra note 11, at
424 (“it is easy and comfortable – especially for intellectuals who do not share the piercing
problems of the hungry or helplessly diseased of the world (who, in other words, face no extreme
problems) – to presume always that the ‘moderate’ solution is the best.); Rev. Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (1963), reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., at 289 (James Melvin Washington ed.,
1986).
64. KRADITOR, supra note 60, at 165.
65. KELLOGG, supra note 11, at x, 42 (mass meetings, investigations, publicity, and legal
aid). A petition drive, like that undertaken to end slavery and the slave trade in the District of
Columbia, might be particularly effective in this internet age. Petitions might address such
subjects as increases in housing subsidies, the minimum wage, and the Earned Income Tax
Credit.
66. See MILLER, supra note 16, at 304 (The mantra of the nineteenth century abolitionists
was “Explain, discuss, argue, persuade.”). See also Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit
Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1159 (1995); White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 763 (Oppressed people “learn how to
design context-specific acts of public resistance, which work, not by overpowering the oppressor,
but by revealing the wrongness and vulnerability of its positions to itself and to a wider public.”);
MILLER, supra note 16, at 507-08 (“if there is a constant drumbeat of moral argument, Calhoun
said, eventually it begins to have its effect, even upon those who initially reject the argument … .
A group of people, a culture, certainly has many ideas on the same topic, diverse and
contradictory, simultaneously present. Argument and persuasion, and the changing of the cultural
atmosphere, can elevate one idea and subordinate another.”).
67. See Bellow, supra note 56, at 297 (describing efforts “to educate the appellate judges of
the D.C. Circuit about the widespread lawlessness that pervaded the administration of criminal
justice”); Martha Minow, Political Lawyering: An Introduction, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 287,
294 (1996) (“Because lawyers work with words, they can tell stories not only to courts and
legislatures, but also to broader publics. . . . Preserving and strengthening settings for face-to-face
telling of stories, demanding justifications, and negotiating constructively . . . remain crucial
lawyering tasks”); Gary Bellow & Martha Minow, Afterword: Constancies and Commonalities in
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Lawyers also, of course, can do conventional lawyer tasks, creating and
creatively applying legislation,68 the domestic use of international legal
standards,69 and reinterpretation of federal and state constitutions.
A variety of legislative actions would contribute to improving the housing
and income situations. Housing subsidies should be increased and focused on
those most in need; housing aid should be an entitlement for the poor as well as
the rich; the minimum wage and Earned Income Tax Credit should be
increased so that they bring workers above poverty – above real poverty,
which is about twice the current “poverty level.”70
This Volume’s Law Stories, IN LAW STORIES: LAW, MEANING AND VIOLENCE 219, 224-25 (Gary
Bellow & Martha Minow, eds. 1996) (“Lawyers’ tools are words”; “law talk works to define both
speaker and audience, altering and creating identities and self-understanding”).
One of the most effective weapons against human slavery was Theodore Weld’s book,
AMERICAN SLAVERY AS IT IS, a compilation of descriptions of slavery. Weld’s book had
immense impact on people generally, and a particularly fruitful impact on what Lincoln is said to
have called the book that started the Civil War. “While she was writing [Uncle Tom’s Cabin],
[Harriet Beecher Stowe] kept Weld’s AMERICAN SLAVERY AS IT IS, with her, carrying it in her
purse and even sleeping with it under her pillow.” MILLER, supra note 16, at 334. Movies may
be at least as effective as books. D.W. Griffith’s film, The Birth of a Nation, had a great impact,
leading the NAACP to attempt to make a counter-movie. See KELLOGG, supra note 11, at 142145.
68. A Legal Services Homelessness Task Force was created by a group of legal services
back-up centers in the early 1980’s. It produced a Litigation Memorandum which ultimately was
published. See HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA: A LITIGATION MEMORANDUM FOR LEGAL
SERVICES ADVOCATES (July 1986) (National Clearinghouse for Legal Services, CN 49,999).
This built on the National Housing Law Project’s Annotated Case Docket re: Homelessness
Litigation (Sept. 1989) (CN 45,055). See also National Housing Law Project, Annotated Docket
of Selected Cases and Other Material Involving Homelessness (Draft No. 7, Sept. 1992). The
Legal Services Homelessness Task Force also was instrumental in developing the legislation that
became the Homeless Persons Survival Act of 1986. See 132 CONG. REC. E2 363-01,99th
Cong.,2d Sess. (June 26, 1986) (introduction of the legislation by Hon. Mickey Leland on behalf
of himself and more than 30 co-sponsors); 133 CONG. REC. E82-03, 100th Cong., 182 Sess. (June
7, 1987) (Mr. Leland’s introduction of the Homeless Person’s Survival Act of 1987, noting that
five portions of the 1986 act had been enacted). The National Coalition for the Homeless was a
participant in this effort. But see, White, supra note 41, at 294 (referring to “its” – the Coalition’s
– Homeless Person’s Survival Act). See also Florence Wagman Roisman, Establishing a Right to
Housing: A General Guide, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 203 (1991) (discussing statutory claims);
FLORENCE WAGMAN ROISMAN, ESTABLISHING A RIGHT TO HOUSING: AN ADVOCATE’S GUIDE
25 (1991) (same); and supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
69. See Maria Foscarinis, Homelessness and Human Rights: Towards an Integrated
Strategy, 20 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 327 (2000); Martha F. Davis, International Human Rights
and United States Law: Predictions of a Courtwatcher, ALB. L. REV. 417 (2000); Bert B.
Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955,
69 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1984); Marc-Olivier Herman, Fighting Homelessness: Can International
Human Rights Law Make a Difference? 2 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 59 (1994).
70. With regard to housing, see Chester Hartman, The Case for a Right to Housing, 9
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 223 (1998); Curtis Berger, Beyond Homelessness: An Entitlement to
Housing, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 315, 326 (1996) (urging a four-pronged statutory strategy,
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With respect to international standards, the critical documents are the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that “everyone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and
necessary social services,”71 and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which recognizes “the right of everyone
to an adequate standard of living . . . , including adequate food, clothing and
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.”72 Abolition
of homelessness and poverty would be advanced by United States ratification
of the ICESCR and by application of the international law norms in domestic
litigation.73
We should not despair of reinterpreting the federal constitution.74 We have
absorbed some damaging legal norms: that poverty is not a suspect
classification;75 that housing is not a fundamental right;76 that the federal
constitution does not impose affirmative duties.77 But we must challenge those
legal principles; we must make fundamental, systemic, radical changes in
constitutional interpretation.78
involving preserving and increasing the supply of subsidized units, strengthening effective
demand, and attending to the specialized needs of particular groups); NATIONAL HOUSING LAW
PROJECT, HOUSING FOR ALL: KEEPING THE PROMISE (1995). With regard to income, see supra
notes 49 to 54 and accompanying text.
71. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 71, U.N. GABOR, 3d Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948), art. 25.
72. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. G.A. Res.
2200(A) (1966), Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. Art. 11(1) also provides that “The States Parties
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right. . . .” The United States has
signed but not ratified this Covenant. See also UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS: COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL
RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES 57 (1997) (calling on
member states “to realize progressively the full range of economic, social and cultural rights). I
would not have known of the reference to the General Comments but for the citation in Helen
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1142 n.55 (1999).
73. See Foscarinis, supra note 69; Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and
International Human Rights Law: Toward An “Entirely New Strategy,” 44 HASTINGS L.J. (1992);
Herman, supra note 69.
74. For a contrary view, see Peter Edelman, Responding to the Wake-Up Call: A New
Agenda for Poverty Lawyers, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 547, 549 (1998) (“Going to
court and invoking the Constitution to bring about basic change for the poor is a nonstarter.”).
Professor Edelman does offer a wealth of suggestions for legislative activity.
75. See San Antonio Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
76. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); but see Roisman, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV., supra note 68, at 209 (arguing that the case does not so hold).
77. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
78. See Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and
Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 801 et seq. (1997) (urging refocus on
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These ideas are not more fixed than were the “separate but equal” and
“state action” doctrines that had to be abandoned with slavery.79 There is a
rich legal literature pointing to theories of constitutional analysis that would
support the recognition of affirmative obligations, as a matter of either
minimum rights or equal rights.80 Professor Black argues “that there is, ‘and of
Right ought to be,’ a constitutional justice of livelihood.”81 He advocates “the
derivation of a constitutional right to a decent material basis for life [] from the
Declaration [of Independence], from the preamble, and from certain parts of
the Constitution proper.”82

rooting welfare rights in the Constitution); Edward A. Hartnett, Review Essay: The Akhil Reed
Amar Bill of Rights, 16 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 373, 400-01 (1999) (reviewing AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998), and characterizing
Professor Amar’s discussion of "Barron contrarians and Reconstruction Republicans") ("Through
legal imagination, political organizing, and personal courage, they changed the constitution and
gave us a new birth of freedom. If they could do it, Amar seems to be saying, so can we.”).
79. See Hixson, supra note 11, at 135.
80. See e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED
AND UNNAMED 131-39 (1997) [hereinafter A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM]; Charles L. Black, Jr.,
Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1986)
(hereinafter Further Reflections); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term—
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 33
(1969) (drawing the minimum protection/equal protection distinction); Frank I. Michelman,
Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659 (1979); William E.
Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999); Akhil Reed Amar,
Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 37 (1996); Sarah Ramsey & Daan Braveman, “Let Them Starve”: Government’s
Obligation to Children in Poverty, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1607 (1995) (considering government
obligation to provide a minimum level of benefits to children); Stephen R. Munzer, Ellickson on
“Chronic Misconduct” in Urban Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Bench Squatters, and Day Laborers,
32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 38-45 (1997); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of our
Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987); Frank E.L. Deale,
The Unhappy History of Economic Rights in the United States and Prospects for Their Creation
and Renewal, 43 HOW. L.J. 281 (2000); Amy L. Wax, The Constitution Under Clinton: A Critical
Assessment: Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political
Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 257 (2000). For a list of articles and
books advocating the recognition of affirmative “welfare” rights under the federal constitution,
see Hershkoff, supra note 72, at 1133 n.9.
81. BLACK, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM, supra note 80, at 133.
82. Black, Further Reflections, supra note 80, at 1105. Professor Black is not alone in
treating the Declaration of Independence as a discrete source of legal authority: “[f]rom the
adoption of the Pennsylvania Gradual Emancipation statute, until the eve of the Civil War,
opponents of slavery would turn to the Declaration of Independence to support their cause.”
Finkelman, supra note 29, at 82; see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 18 (1988) (“The favorite document of these
antislavery advocates was the Declaration of Independence. . . .”).
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There was a point when the Supreme Court seemed to be imposing special
constraints on classifications that burdened poor people.83 And the recent
decision in Saenz v. Roe84 indicates that such claims can be successful with the
current court, at least if they are presented in structural terms.85 The principle
that underlies strict scrutiny is that a “more searching judicial inquiry” is
appropriate when “prejudice” has “curtailed the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect” people.86 This principle
classically is applied to “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities,”87
but it applies with equal force to prejudice against poor people, for whom the
operations of ordinary political processes also are curtailed.88

83. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment: Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or
Immunities Revival Portend the Future—or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 110, 121 n.53 (1999) (discussing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956)); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968); and
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (Due Process Clause requires that state pay for blood testing
for determining paternity).
84. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
85. See Tribe, supra note 83, at 140 (arguing that “claims of individual rights are most likely
to have power and ultimately to prevail if they can be convincingly expressed through the
language, and clearly understood through the logic, of such concretely architectural features of
the Constitution as the separation of powers or. . .the federal system of separate, equal, and semiautonomous states”). The more usual view of Saenz that it “might be the harbinger of a revival of
the privileges and immunities clause.” See Hartnett, supra note 78, at 393 n.29. See also M.L.B.
v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (appeal of termination of parental rights cannot be conditioned on
payment for preparation of record). Professor Tribe considers that Little v. Streater and M.L.B. v.
S.L.J. “are best understood” as based not on concerns about poverty but on “special solicitude for
rights related to marriage, parenting or reproduction.” Tribe, supra note 83, at 118.
86. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
87. Id.
88. There is a substantial literature about the influence of money on political processes. See
e.g., Jamin B. Raskin & Burton D. Wechsler, Constitutional Implications of Campaign Finance
Reform, 8 ADMIN. L.J. 161 (1994); Jamin B. Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional
Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1160 (1994); Jamin B. Raskin & John Bonifaz, Focus on: Restoring Faith in Government: Equal
Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273 (1993). Prejudice against
people because of the amount or source of their income is substantial. The history of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides some support for devoting special concern to discrimination on
the basis of poverty. See NELSON, supra note 82, at 117 (quoting language to this effect from the
ratification debates); see id. at 129 (quoting such language used by the floor manager of the
amendment in the Senate).
Similarly, Professor Tribe emphasizes the significance of Justice Kennedy’s having
begun his opinion in Romer v. Evans with a quotation from Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson. See Tribe, supra note 83, at 179 (citing Romer v, Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996)
(quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896))). Professor Tribe sees in this “a strong
signal that, to Justice Kennedy, Amendment 2 was of a piece with government classification of
persons in terms of race, national ancestry, or whatever other criteria have long struck the Justice
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State constitutional provisions hold great promise for attacking
homelessness and poverty. The New York Court of Appeals extended a right
to shelter to homeless women under equal protection principles after a lower
court had entered a preliminary injunction requiring that overnight shelter be
provided for homeless men under other standards.89 Equal protection
principles were applied to benefit homeless women and families in Indiana.90
The intermediate appellate court in New York has held that the New York
constitution includes a right to overnight shelter.91 The Connecticut Supreme
Court has come very close to recognizing a state constitutional right to
minimal subsistence. In Moore v. Ganim,92 a four judge majority held that
there was no such right; Chief Justice Ellen Peters concurred in the result, but
filed a separate opinion explaining that she was “persuaded that the
Connecticut constitution includes a governmental obligation to provide a
minimal safety net to our poorest residents.”93 Two other members of the
court dissented, holding that such a right was embodied in the state
constitution.94

as despicable precisely because they reflect and reinforce the deepest and most destabilizing
divisions that have marked our nation's history.” It cannot be impossible to convince five justices
that the distinction of wealth from poverty is one of “the deepest and most destabilizing. . .that
have marked our nation’s history.” See also Tribe, supra note 83, at 168-69 (describing a
structural argument for rights of “life-shaping autonomy,” an argument that would apply as well
to rights to subsistence. The argument is that a nation cannot have effective self-government
when its citizens lack food, shelter, and other basic necessities). See also Edelman, supra note
80, at 61 (“Anyone who argues that the poor are now fully heard in Congress and the state
legislatures has not examined the history of their situation since 1978.”).
89. See Callahan v. Carey, N.Y. L.J. Dec. 11, 1979, at 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 5, 1979)
(preliminary injunction requiring City of New York to develop a plan to provide shelter for
homeless men); Eldredge v. Koch, 98 A.D.2d 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (right to shelter
extended to homeless women under equal protection standard).
90. See Center Township of Marion County, Indiana v. Coe, 572 N.E.2d 1350, 1361-62 (Ind.
Ct.App. 1991) (“We agree with the courts of New York that unequal treatment of homeless
women and families denies those women and families the equal protection guarantees of the State
and Federal Constitutions.”). See also Roisman, Establishing a Right to Housing: A General
Guide, supra note 68, at 209-10 (discussing a similar case in Maryland and theories under which
state equal protection claims might prevail).
91. McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 70
N.Y.2d 109 (N.Y. 1987) (Appellate Division holds that the state constitution extends a right to
shelter to homeless families; the state constitutional argument is not presented to the Court of
Appeals). The state courts continue to enforce this right. See McCain v. Giuliani, 236 A.D.2d
256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), appeal denied, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4993 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997) (enforcing trial court orders).
92. Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742 (Conn. 1995); see also Hilton v. City of New Haven,
661 A.2d 973 (Conn. 1995) (companion case involving the right to shelter; relying on Moore v.
Ganim, the judges divide as they did in that case).
93. Moore, 660 A.2d at 771 (Peters, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 783 (Berdon, J., dissenting, with whom Katz, J. joined).
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Similar claims have been presented to the New Jersey courts.95 While
those claims have not been ruled on by the New Jersey Supreme Court (or
accepted by the intermediate appellate court), the New Jersey Supreme Court
has held, in the famous Mount Laurel cases,96 that the state constitution forbids
zoning decisions that “favor rich over poor,”97 and Professor John Payne has
recently outlined an argument that Mount Laurel actually rests on a state
constitutional right to have housing provided—a right that is affirmative
though conditional.98
These state constitutional arguments can be extended to other states.
“[E]very state constitution in the United States addresses social and economic
concerns, and provides the basis for a variety of positive claims against the
government”99; “more than a dozen state constitutions provide explicit
protections for the poor.”100 Those who seek to abolish homelessness and

95. See Franklin v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 543 A.2d 56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988),
aff’d on other grounds, 543 A.2d 1 (1988) (N.J. 1988). The constitutional and statutory claims
were being developed in a concerted campaign in New Jersey, but the campaign essentially ended
with the dismantling of the New Jersey Office of Public Advocate and the imposition of
restrictions on the federally-funded legal services program. See Roisman, ESTABLISHING A
RIGHT TO HOUSING: AN ADVOCATE'S GUIDE, supra note 68, at 32-33, 42 (discussing the New
Jersey campaign); Roisman, Establishing a Right to Housing: A General Guide, supra note 68, at
221-22 (same). The New Jersey Office of Public Advocate was created in 1974 and eliminated in
1994. See Department of the Public Advocate Act of 1974, ch. 27, 2, 1974 N.J. Laws 67, 67 (N.J.
STAT. ANN. §52:27E-51); Mark Green & Laurel W. Eisner, The Public Advocate for New York
City: An Analysis of the Country’s Only Elected Ombudsman, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1093, 1153
(1998) (The Office of the New Jersey Public Advocate “was eliminated entirely in January 1994,
when the Republicans won control of both the statehouse and the legislature.”); Geoffrey R.
Scott, The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine: A Warning to Environmentalists and Policy Makers,
10 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1, 45 n.129 (1998) (The Office was dismantled in 1994 by Governor
Whitman “as a cost-saving measure.”). With respect to the restrictions on the legal services
program, see Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-134, §504, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53-56 (reenacted in the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions
and Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §502, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997)); and
Velazquez v. Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (invalidating only a restriction on
challenging welfare laws).
96. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (1975),
cert. denied and app. dis, 423 U.S. 808 [Mt. Laurel I]; Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) [Mt. Laurel II].
97. Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 415 (because “the State controls the use of land, all of the
land. . . it cannot favor rich over poor”).
98. See John M. Payne, Reconstructing the Constitutional Theory of Mount Laurel II, 3
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 555 (2000).
99. Hershkoff, supra note 72, at 1135.
100. Id. at 1135, 1140 n.44 (identifying some such states). See also Adam S. Cohen, After the
War: Poverty Law in the 1980s: More Myths of Parity: State Court Forums and Constitutional
Actions for the Right to Shelter, 38 EMORY L.J. 615 (1989).
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poverty may work to amend state constitutions to add such provisions101 or to
implement such provisions as already exist.102
What I urge is that antihomelessness advocates always keep our eyes “on
the prize.” To produce major social change requires that individuals strive with
determination to achieve that goal. Heeding the naysayers will produce
nothing useful.103 Professor Don Fehrenbacher explained that the 18th century
anti-slavery movement “failed, . . . not because its supporters lacked sincerity,
but rather because they lacked the intensity of conviction that inspires
concentrated effort and carries revolutions through to success.”104 “For slavery
to be ended there had to be some individual human beings who did what they
did. . . . there were some people—a very small number, on the margin of
society, condemned and harassed—who nevertheless made it the first order of
their life’s business to oppose American slavery, and to insist that it was a
grotesque evil that should be eliminated, and . . . in a little over thirty years, it
was.”105 I urge that we do the same to end homelessness and poverty.
The battle is long, and requires constant vigilance, but not to fight would
be unpardonable.

101. See, e.g., Frank M. Smizik & Michael Stone, Single Parent Families and a Right to
Housing, in WOMEN AS SINGLE PARENTS: CONFRONTING INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS IN THE
COURTS, THE WORKPLACE, AND THE HOUSING MARKET 227-66 (Elizabeth A. Mulroy ed., 1988)
(discussing an effort to amend the Massachusetts constitution to add a right to shelter).
102. See Roisman, Establishing a Right to Housing: A General Guide, supra note 68, at 20910 (discussing constitutional claims). These advocates will find substantial assistance in
Professor Hershkoff’s “project about state courts and state constitutions.” Hershkoff, supra note
72, at 1137; see also Helen Hershkoff, Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1403 (1999); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the
Judicial Function (unpublished manuscript, on file with Professor Hershkoff).
103. See Zinn, Abolitionists, Freedom-Riders, and the Tactics of Agitation, supra note 11, at
432 (quoting Wendell Phillips, “speaking affectionately of the abolitionist leader Angelina
Grimke: ‘Were I to single out the moral and intellectual trait which won me, it was her serene
indifference to the judgement of those about her.’”).
104. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9 (1981) (emphasis in original).
105. MILLER, supra note 16, at 513.

